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McCauley and Morgan: The Wyoming Air Quality Act

LEGISLATIVE COMMENT
THE WYOMING AIR QUALITY ACT
In 1967, the Wyoming State Legislature enacted the
Wyoming Air Quality Act.' It is probably safe to surmise
that a great deal of the impetus behind the passage of the
Act arose from the realization that the Federal Government
would interfere if the State remained inactive, and would
force upon the State standards set by the Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, as
provided by the Federal Air Pollution Control Act.2
The purpose of the Wyoming Act is to regulate the pollution of air in the State of Wyoming for the health, safety and
welfare of the people of the state. Implicit in the scope of
such legislation is the recognition that air pollution is a health
hazard. This Act is not the first indication that the state
government recognizes air pollution to be a hazard to health.
City ordinances have in the past been aimed at the control
of such a nuisance, in the form of zoning ordinances, etc.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has on occasion taken judicial
notice that smoke, gas, dust and noxious odors are inherently
harmful.' But, whether or not air pollution was considered
a nuisance in the past, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized, in the case of Hillmer v. McConnell Bros.,4 that
As a general rule, the police power of the state
extends to the prevention and abatement of nuisances; and a legislative body within constitutional
limits, may prescribe what shall constitute a nuisance. This power extends to the prohibiting of acts
or things not considered offensive or injurious in
the past."
It is questionable whether anyone would contest the power of
the state to enact this anti-pollution legislation on the grounds
that such pollution was not a nuisance at common law. Such
a question has been raised in other states, at earlier dates.
However, in view of the Hillmer decision, and in view of the
6
Wyoming decision recognizing pollution to be a nuisance,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

WYO. STAT. § 35-487 to § 35-504 (Supp. 1967).
42 U.S.C. 4 1857(d) (1967).
Sheridan Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. State, 384 P.2d 597, 600 (Wyo. 1963).
414 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1966).
Id. at 973.
Sheridan Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. State, supra note 3.
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such an argument would be difficult to seriously offer to the
court for consideration. In addition, the question of whether
pollution is in fact a health hazard, in this day of modern
science and technology, would be quickly answered in the
positive.'
The State of Wyoming is in the peculiar situation of
passing air pollution control measures before the state has
suffered greatly from the effects of modern industrialization.
The state is still relatively sparsely populated, and only a few
localities have been introduced to the blight of industrial air
pollution. Thus, Wyoming is in an enviable position of being
armed to stop pollution before it starts. However, the Act
puts the state in an awkward position insofar as one of the
recurrent problems of the state economy is the need to attract
new industry into the state. The saving grace of course will
be that industry cannot fail to realize that, in view of the
recent Federal legislation in this area, air pollution control
will be an expense wherever industry turns throughout the
United States in the near future. Industry may even be
attracted to this state by virtue of a provision of the Act,
that the Wyoming standards will never be more stringent
than those required by Federal law. Thus, Wyoming standards will not fluctuate above the minimum standards to be
found anywhere in the United States.
Our purpose here shall be to review the statute with an
eye toward possible areas of weakness, that is, with a view to
investigating the provisions of the Act most likely to come
under attack should litigation arise under the Act.
TUE GENERAL CONSTITUTIONALITY

Air pollution is not a modern problem! The first smoke
abatement law was passed during the reign of Edward I, in
1273, prohibiting the use of coal as being detrimental to
human health.9 But the development of modern industry
and the modern megalopolis has created a crisis which our
legislatures are not attempting to cope with through legis7. For a brief recital of the damaging effects of air pollution on health and
property, see 9 RuTcEaRS L. REv. 616-620 (1955).
8. In William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1611), the court enjoined the
maintenance of a pigstye by the defendant when the pigstye so corrupted
his neighbor's air as to constitute a nuisance.
9. Chass & Feldman, Tears for John Doe, 27 S. CAL. L. R-v. 349, 352 (1954).
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lation. Such legislation is so recent that there is little case
law directly in point."0 In turning to other related areas of
the law, it is possible to prognosticate with some confidence
as to the direction the courts will take when the validity of
these statutes is questioned.
Legislation in this area has been implemented through
the use of the state police power to regulate commerce for
the health, safety, and welfare of the public. The end result
of such legislation is the imposition of use restrictions on
property. The courts have generally recognized that such use
restrictions on property are valid if they "find their jurisdiction in some aspect of the police power exerted for the
public welfare. Unless the particular regulation bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, comfort,
convenience, or the general good and welfare in the proper
sense, it is an invasion of the constitutional right of private
property."11 Not only does the statute declare the fundamental policy behind the Act to be the promotion of public
health and welfare, 2 but, as noted in the Sheridan Drive-In,
Inc. case, the Wyoming Supreme Court has taken judicial
notice of the fact that pollution is a hazard to public health.
It is therefore doubtful that the Wyoming courts will find
the Act to be an unconstitutional restriction on the use of
property.
The first general question which arises is whether abatement of air pollution is a reasonable, not an arbitrary, exercise of the state police power to regulate commerce. It has
generally been held that such an exercise is constitutional if
the regulation does not interfere with interstate commerce,
The question of
and is not arbitrary and unreasonable.
interference with interstate commerce would seem most easily
answered. The United States Supreme Court held in the
Huron PortlandCement Co. case 4 that the Detroit ordinance
prohibiting air pollution did not interfere with interstate corn10. The United States Air Pollution Control Act has been litigated only once,
U.S. v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D.C. Md. 1968). The
Wyoming Air Quality Act has yet to be litigated.
11. State ex rel. George v. Hull, 65 Wyo. 251, 199 P.2d 832 (1948).
12. WYo. STAT. § 35-488 (Supp. 1967).
13. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Northwest Laundry Co. v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916) ; Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp. v. City of Kingsport, 189 Tenn. 450, 225 S.W.2d 270 (1949).
14. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, supra note 13.
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merce, without discussing why it did not interfere with interstate commerce."
The question of the validity of this Act as to unreasonable and arbitrary regulation may be more meritoreous than
the preceding question. An exercise of a regulatory police
power is valid if it is not arbitrary and unreasonable in application. 6 The Wyoming Air Quality Act provides that "Any
rule or regulation or standards, or amendment thereof, may
differ in its terms and provisions ... as between particular
air pollution sources .... 11
It would seem from the wording of the particular clause
quoted above that the language could be plainly construed
as authorization to differentiate between two sources similarly
situated, polluting in the same manner, and to the same
degree. Should such a situation ever arise, the pollutant
unfavorably affected will be certain to raise the question of
unconstitutional and arbitrary application of the Act.
One answer to this problem may be found in decisions
treating application of zoning ordinances. In a representative case, Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, i" the plaintiff was foreclosed from running a gravel
operation on his land by the zoning board while, in the same
zone on adjacent land, a neighboring gravel operation was
permitted a variance. The court found that plaintiff's operation, in and of itself, raised sufficient dust and sand to constitute a pollution hazard to the people of the adjoining town,
without regard to what the other operation does. Therefore,
the zoning board did not act capriciously, arbitrarily and unreasonably in enjoining plaintiff's operation.
It would seem, then, that if this case would lend direction, the emphasis in future litigation will be placed on the
hazard the individual pollutant represents to the community;
not on a comparative, but on an individual basis.
IENFORCEMENT As To MUNICIPAUTIES

A further problem arises to the applicability of the Act
to cities. A person is defined by the Act to be, among others,
15. See, Note, 59 MICH. L. REV. 964, 965 (1961).
16. See note 13.
17. WYo. STAT. § 35-491(c) (Supp. 1967).
18. 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 370 P.2d 342 (1962).
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a municipality." The standards set by the Council are to be
enforced against any person found contaminating the air."
But, the Act stipulates, "Nothing in this Act shall supersede
or limit the applicability of any law or ordinance relating
to sanitation, industrial health or safety."'"
At least one Wyoming city provides in its ordinances
that "The city manager is hereby authorized to establish
rules and regulations for the operation of the city dump
22
ground and its use by the public."
If the Act is not to supersede the applicability of any
ordinance, then it may be understood that a city may continue
to operate its dump in such a manner 23 as to cause air pollution. The only qualification would seem to be that the city
must have made such provision for the operation of the dump
in its ordinances, and that the ordinance be enacted prior to
the effective date of the Air Quality Act.
On reflection, however, doubts arise as to the legitimacy
of such contentions. The legislature did manifest an intent
to abate air pollution. It also specifically identified the
municipality as an entity governed by the statute.
There is a body of law which deals with exceptions to
statutes. Exceptions to a statute should be reasonably construed. 4 Ordinarily, a statute and an exception proviso or
saving clause constituting a part thereof are to be considered
together in endeavoring to ascertain legislative intent.2 5 Here,
the legislative intent as to application of the anti-pollution
standards to cities is confused. An over-view of the whole
Act would seem to indicate that cities were meant to be
governed by the Act. Impliedly, all that would be excepted
from the Act and its standards are city ordinances previously
in effect which already provided for standards governing air
pollution. Such would be the only reasonable construction of
WYo. STAT. § 35-489(d) (Supp. 1967).
WYo. STAT. § 35-495 (Supp. 1967).
WYO. STAT. § 35-502(c) (Supp. 1967).
LARAMIE, WYO., CODE § 15-23 (1964).
Laramie, Wyoming, operates an open-pit incineration dump. The trash is
first burned, then buried.
24. Palkosky v. Garcia, 19 N.J. 175, 115 A.2d 539, 542 (1955); State v. Brown,
22 N.J. 450, 126 A.2d 161, 166 (1956); Lien v. Rowe, 77 S.D. 422, 92
N.W.2d 922, 924 (1958).
25. McJimsey v. City of Des Moines, 231 Iowa 693, 2 N.W.2d 65, 68 (1942).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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the saving clause2" when considered as a part of the whole Act.
The fact that such intent is not clearly set forth in the language
of the clause may lead to litigation.
OPERATION OF THE WYOMING

Am

QUALITY

ACT

The Wyoming Air Quality Act is designed to effectuate
the policy of maintaining "a reasonable degree of purity of
the air resources of the state." 2 An air resource council is
established under the Act, which is charged with the responsibility of establishing rules, regulations, and standards regarding air pollution levels throughout the state, and also with the
duty of enforcement of such standards, rules or requirements.
The council is composed of three representatives of
related state agencies (health, agriculture, land and water
conservation), and six members to be appointed by the Governor, one from municipal government, three from industry,
and two from the public at large. The division of administration of the Department of Public Health is given the responsibility of doing the research, administrative tasks, pollution
level measurement and enforcement of rules, etc. for the
council.
The first job of the council was to establish ambient air
standards "and/or" emission control requirements and rules
for the state. The standards for the state were established
after a series of public hearings concerning all interested
parties throughout the state, the standards being set pursuant
to general guidelines laid down by the legislature and incorporated into the Act.
Since the general air pollution standard has been adopted
by the council for the state, the appropriate Department of
Health teams have proceeded to test scientifically the air
pollution levels of various parts of the state, to see if violations of the standard set by the council are occurring. The
testing of the air in different state areas continues as of this
time.
If, after the testing procedure the division has cause to
believe that a rule, regulation, or air standard is being violated, or if a written and verified complaint alleging a viola26. Wyo. STAT. § 35-502 (c) (Supp. 1967).
27. Wyo. STAT. § 35-488 (Supp. 1967).
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tion is filed with the division, a prompt investigation is to

be made. If the division finds a violation, it shall try through
conciliation to eliminate the source or cause of the air pollution violation.
If conciliation fails, the division may issue a cease and
desist order against the pollutant source, such pollution order
to become final unless within 30 days after the notice of the
order, the pollutant source asks for a hearing before the council. If a hearing is requested, the council may affirm, modify,
or reverse the cease and desist order. Violation of any order,
rule, or regulation causes the offender to be guilty of a misdemeanor (if found guilty in the courts), and misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of $750/week of violation. Misdemeanor
action is not a bar to further court proceedings to enforce the
provision of the Act, because the division is given the power
to institute any necessary enforcement proceedings in the
name of the state.
The fact that the act provides for fines and further court
action to enforce the act does not deprive the private citizen
of his right to bring suit against the pollutant source in the
courts.
Various emergency provisions are contained in the Act,
whereby pollution can be immediately halted if an imminently
dangerous situation of air pollution exists. The provisions
call for "hurry-up" hearing procedures so that the council
itself may determine what action is appropriate and whether
the cessation of the polluting emission should be ordered to
continue. The Act clearly states that such emergency provisions as are contained in the Act are not to limit any power
which any authorized officer of the state may have to declare
an emergency and act on that declaration.
The council has the authority to examine witnesses, issue
subpoenae, and obtain evidence relevant to the air pollution
situation under consideration. This information may include
all relevant records and information of any private source of
contamination, but such information is to be kept confidential,
unless approved by the contamination source for release to
the public.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969
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Any authorized person in connection with the division has
the right of entry on the premises (except private residences)
where a pollutant source is or may be located. The right of
entry must be at a reasonable time, and the occupant or
operator of the premises shall receive a written report setting
forth all facts which relate to the compliance status of the
source. All provisions of the Act relating to rules, regulations
orders, setting of standards, variances, enforcement procedures, etc., are subject to the provisions of the Wyoming
Administrative Procedure Act.
Finally, the Act expressly does not have jurisdiction or
authority over pollution existing solely on private or industrial property. The Act cannot affect employer-employee
relationships with regard to air pollution problems. And
finally, the Act does not supersede or limit the applicability
of any law or ordinance relating to sanitation, industrial
health or safety.
This capsule summary of the provisions of the Wyoming
Air Quality Act is included merely to give the reader an
overview of the operation of the Act. Specific provisions will
be dealt with in greater depth in the course of the article.
"TAKING"

QUESTION

The Council is given the authority to establish "such
ambiant air standards and/or emission control requirements
,.. as in its judgment may be necessary to prevent, abate, or
control air pollution. I Further, the council is given certain
enforcement tools with which to ensure compliance with the
above-mentioned standards and requirements.
The Act2" gives the division of public health power to
issue "cease and desist" orders pursuant to a notice-public
hearing procedure, such "cease and desist" orders being
capable of extending for indefinite periods of time depending
upon the aggrieved party's lack of action in regard to contesting the order,"0 or upon the council's power to affirm the
order after a hearing." It should be noted that the aggrieved
Wyo. STAT.
29. WYo.STAT.
30. WYo. STAT.
31. WYO. STAT.
28.

§ 35-494(a) (Supp, 1967).
§ 35-495 (Supp. 1967).
§ 35-495(c) (Supp. 1967).
§ 35-495(d) (Supp. 1967).
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party is at all times entitled to judicial review of the order
by the Wyoming Administrative
"in the manner prescribed
2
Act."
Procedure
Also, under specified types of emergency situations, the
director of the Department of Health may issue immediate
"cease and desist" orders subject to (in some "generalized"
air pollution situations) the concurrence of the governor in
the issuance of the order,3 3 and in all situations, "generalized"
or not, to the power of the council to affirm, deny, or modify
4
the order."
The granting of variances of the standards and requirements,8 5 while primarily intended as means with which to
alleviate the economic hardship of immediate compliance with
the standards or requirements, are nevertheless subject to the
provision that they may continue only until such time as the
necessary means of pollution control become available,3" or
only for a time period which would allow a reasonable distribution of the cost of the abatement methods. 7
Violation of any regulation or order of the council is
punishable by a fine (misdemeanor) not to exceed $750 per
week of violation. 88
Finally, the Division of Public Health is given the authority to bring, in the name of the state, court proceedings for
injunction or other appropriate judicial remedy," against a
pollutant source which has failed to comply with council
regulations, orders, or requirements.
The enforcement tools above enumerated, of the Wyoming Air Quality Act are essential for the accomplishment
of the pure air purpose of the Act, but by their very nature
they raise an issue common to most kinds of regulation of
property use legislation promulgated under the general
authority of police power. That issue is whether the regulation of property uses, causing elimination of the value of the
property or complete prohibition of its use. under the authorSTAT. §

85-498(c)

(Supp. 1967).

33. WYo. STAT. § 35-496(a)

(Supp. 1967).

32. WYO.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

WYO.STAT. §
WYo. STAT. §
WYo. STAT. §
Wyo. STAT. §
WYO. STAT. §
WYO. STAT. §

35-496(a) and (b) (Supp. 1967).
35-497 (Supp. 1967).
35-497(i) (Supp. 1967).
35-497(ii) (Supp. 1967).
35-500(a) (Supp. 1967).
35-500(b) (Supp. 1967).
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ity of an act promulgated under the police power of the state,
constitutes a "taking" of property without compensation,
which is unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution and art. 1, sections 32
and 33 of the Wyoming Constitution.
It is doubtless obvious to the reader that the issuance of
a cease and desist order in regard to any type of industrial
plant, would involve at least some diminution of value of the
plant operation, and, at most, a prohibition of the operation
itself. Compliance with the Act through the variance procedure, which involves a procedure for abatement of the
pollution level over a period of time, will involve some diminution in the value of the property regulated.
As to the diminution question, the U.S. Supreme Court"0
and the Wyoming Supreme Court,4' are in agreement that a
regulation or order promulgated under the police power which
merely diminishes the value of property by restricting a use
upon it is constitutional.
The real problem involving "taking" arises, however,
when the enforcement of the Act causes not merely a reasonable diminution of the value of the property regulated, but
causes a diminution to the point of prohibition of the use to
which the property had formerly been put. In other words,
while the courts are sure the diminution as the result of regulation under police power laws is acceptable, they hesitate to
some extent to allow actual prohibition of a property use, for
the benefit of the public, without some compensation to the
prohibited owner. It should further be noted that, in the
context of the Wyoming Air Quality Act, the general class
of property uses (industrial) which will bear the brunt of
the regulation, and hence, the possibility of prohibition, are
uses which hitherto had been considered beneficial.
Perhaps, the problem which may arise may be illustrated
by a hypothetical ore-refining plant in the State of Wyoming
which has long been established on the outskirts of a Wyoming town. In order to refine ore it is necessary for the plant
40. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922) ; Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
41. Weaver v. Pub. Services Comm., 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542 (1929); Steffy v.
City of Casper, 357 P.2d 456 (Wyo. 1961); Hillmer v. McConnell Bros.,
414 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1966).
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to operate large furnaces with stacks which emit smoke and
fumes of a very noxious nature over the town. Any change
in the refining method involving abatement of the emissions
would be impossible or highly impractical. The emission level
from the plant is tested by the division of public health and
is found to exceed the maximum pollution level allowable. The
council finds that a variance on the basis of economic hardship
or lack of practical reduction methods cannot be granted
because it is proved that the emissions from the plant tend
to endanger human health, and that the economic loss to the
community if the plant was to be closed down is minor compared to the benefit of elimination of the health hazard. The
council therefore affirms the cease and desist order of the
division and the company is forced to close. The company
then takes its situation to court, claiming that the enforcement of the Wyoming Air Quality Act has forced a prohibition of their ore-refining operation, and hence, is unconstitutional as a taking of property without compensation.
Two of the classic Supreme Court cases dealing with
regulation of property by police power statutes, Mugler v.
Kansas,;2 and PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. Mahon," while agreeing on the concept of reasonable diminution, disagree as to
whether regulation amounting to prohibition constitutes an
unconstitutional taking.
The Mugler decision stated that:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for
purposes that are declared by valid legislation, to be
injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking
or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit."
On the other hand, Justice Holmes, writing the Pennsylvania Coal decision in 1922, stated:
Some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its limits. One fact for
consideration in determining such limits is the
extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an
42. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).

43. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
44. Mugler v. Kansas, supra note 42, at 668-669.
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exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act. 5
In 1962, the Supreme Court, in the case of Goldblatt v.
Hempstead" made a somewhat unclear attempt to determine
which "regulation" doctrine would be adopted as a standard
by the court. In Goldblatt, the Court upheld a municipal
ordinance which was a valid exercise of police power, and
which totally deprived the owner of certain of the property
regulated by the ordinance of the beneficial use to which the
property had formerly been devoted. The Court first stated
that "if [the] ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the
town's police powers, the fact that it deprives the property
of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional." 7 The Court proceeded, however, to show some deference to Justice Holmes' diminution theory by continuing:
This is not to say, however, that governmental action
in the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to
constitute a taking which constitutionally requires
compensation . .. although a comparison of values
before and after is relevant . . . it is by no means

conclusive. 8
The state of taking law as a result of the Goldblatt case
is aptly summed up by an authority on eminent domain, Professor Joseph L. Sax," who states:
Unfortunately, the incomplete state of the record
in Goldblatt relieved the court from having to decide
just when onerous became too onerous, or how seriously the court was going to take its stated deference
to Mr. Justice Holmes' theory."'
Therefore, the status of the right of government to prohibit
certain property uses under the police power is still to be
decided, as far as the U.S. Supreme Court is concerned.
It should be noted at this point that Professor Sax has
proposed a rule for taking cases which would probably eliminate many of the uncertainties created by the Goldblatt decision, or at the very least, would set forth a clearer set of
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra note 43, at 413.
369 U.S. 590 (1962).
Id. at 592.
Id. at 594.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School.
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 43 (1964).
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guidelines to determine whether compensation in the context
of a certain fact situation is required. The rule, stated succintly by Professor Sax is,
[T]hat when economic loss is incurred as a result of
government enhancement of its resource position in
its enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required ....[B]ut losses, however severe,
incurred as a consequence of government acting
merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as
a non-compensable exercise of the police power.5
The Wyoming Supreme Court, in the fashion of the
U.S. Supreme Court, has developed a body of case law on
taking apparently based on the Mugler and Pennsylvania
Coal doctrines, which, as has been suggested, are perhaps
somewhat cumbersome when applied to the taking problems
of the present.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's stand on taking is more
clearly on the side of the Mugler (allowance of prohibition)
doctrine. In Weaver v. Public Service Comm'n " the Court
declared that, "the Legislature may prohibit occupations
that are detrimental to the public welfare, but only if detrimental."" In Hilmer v. McConnell Brothers," the Wyoming
court, in a reversal of a district court decision, ordered an
injunction to issue against a rabbit processing plant, which
excluded noxious odors over the surrounding territory, and
was prohibited by an ordinance of the City of Laramie which
prohibited placing offal, carcasses, or refuse in a locality
where it might become a source of annoyance, or within a half
mile of a dwelling or public road. The court stated, as noted
previously in this article, that the police power, in regard to
prevention and abatement of nuisances, "extends to the prohibiting of acts or things not considered offensive or injurious
in the past.""
While the trend in Wyoming, on the basis of the Weaver
and Hirlmer cases would indicate a direction of the court in
favor of the Mugler doctrine, one Wyoming case, Steffey v.
City of Casper" clouds the statement of a clear doctrine, some51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
278
Id.,
414
Id.
357

at 63.
P. 542, supra note 41.
278 P. at 548.
P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1966).
at 973.
P.2d 456 (Wyo. 1961).
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what in the fashion of the "onerous" proviso in the Goldblatt
decision.
Steffey involved a situation wherein the court upheld the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance prohibiting trading
stamps as a valid exercise of the police power. However, in
the course of the decision, the court noted:
We might say in this connection that counsel
who are in favor of trading stamps admit that the
legislation may make reasonable regulations of any
business but that it may not prohibitit. But the legislature has not prohibited business. It has merely
prohibited an incident to or a particular method in
connection with business. That is merely regulation ....

Regulation necessarily implies restriction

in some respects, and that means nothing more or less
than a partial prohibition. 7
It is interesting to note that while the court in the Steffey
opinion says that business can "be reasonably regulated" but
not prohibited, it continues its discussion with some extremely
pertinent elaboration of its basic statement to the effect that
particular methods incident to and in connection with business can be prohibited. In connection with a "taking" involving prohibition of business in the context of the Wyoming Air
Quality Act, it could be argued that the use of a cease and
desist order or other method to abate the level of pollution
would be prohibition merely of a particular method in connection with a business, and not of the business itself. It should
also be noted that a plausible argument on the other side could
be made, to the effect that prohibition of the process causing
the pollution is, as a matter of fact, the prohibition of the
business itself, and hence any regulation causing prohibition would be unconstitutional as a "taking" without
compensation.
However, the general trend of decisions in Wyoming in
regard to the "taking" question would appear to authorize
the enforcement of Air Quality Act standards and requirements to the point, if necessary, of causing the shut-down of
a pollutant source. This would greatly facilitate the effectiveness of the enforcement procedure under the Act, and would
provide a considerable incentive on the part of business and
57. Id. at 461.
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properties affected by the Act's authority to conform to the
standards, orders, or requirements laid down by the council.
RIGHT OF ENTRY

FOR PLTRPOSE OF INSPECTION

The Wyoming Air Quality Act provides:
Any duly authorized officer, employee, or representative of the division may enter and inspect any
property, premise or place, except private residences,
on or at which an air contaminant source is located
or is being constructed or installed at any reasonable
time upon reasonable notice to the owner, occupant,
or operator thereof for the purposes of investigating
actual sources of air pollution and for ascertaining
compliance or non-compliance with this Act or rules,
regulations, or orders promulgated hereunder. Such
owner or occupant or operator of the premises shall
receive a written report setting forth all facts found
which relate to compliance status."
It is essential to note that this section provides for no
warrant procedure in regard to the power of "any duly
authorized officer, employee, or representative of the division," to enter and inspect. This applies to all kinds of property upon which air pollution sources might be located, "except private residences." During the fall of 1966, during
which time the Air Quality Act was being formulated, the
status of the law was such that an administrative agency
could, without bothering with the warrant procedure, order
valid inspection of all classes of property, including private
property. Authority for their administrative inspection right
was based on two Supreme Court cases, Frank v. Maryland 9
6" Both cases involved warrantless inand Eatin v. Price.
spections of private property by administrative officials
(health and housing inspectors), and in both cases, the right
of the officials to inspect premises without a warrant was
upheld. In 1967, however, the Court's view of administrative
inspection was completely altered. In Camera v. Municipal
Court,"' a case involving the issue of constitutionality of a
warrantless administrative health inspection of private
premises, the Court held that administrative searches by
58. WYO. STAT. § 35-493 (Supp. 1967).
59. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
60. 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
61. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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municipal health and safety inspectors of private property
are "significant intrusions upon the interests protected by
the 4th Amendment, that such searches when authorized and
conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional
safeguards which the 4th Amendment guarantees to the individual,"" and hence are unconstitutional. See v. City of
Seattle3 sealed the constitutional fate of the warrantless
administrative inspection doctrine in a case involving an
action by the City of Seattle against a warehouse owner for
his refusal to admit the city fire inspector to his locked warehouse. In the See case the Supreme Court expanded the
Camera rule requiring administrative inspectors to have
warrants for inspection of private property to commercial
property inspections. The court stated:
The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his
private commercial property. The businessman, too,
has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to
enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws
can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field
without official authority evidenced by warrant.. .. " We therefore conclude that administrative entry,
without consent, upon the portion of commercial
premises which are not open to the public may only
be compelled through prosecution or physical force
within the framework of a warrant procedure.'.
In light of the Camara and See cases, one can only conclude that the warrantless inspection procedure provided for
in the Air Quality Act"6 could be unconstitutional if tested
in the courts. The difficulty of enforcement of the Wyoming
Air Quality Act without the benefit of warrantless inspection
is bard to determine at this time. In a vigorous dissent to
the Camara and See opinions, Justice Clark, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, speaking on the warrantless system
of administrative inspection, states: "It is regrettable that
the Court wipes out such a long and widely accepted practice
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 534.
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 545.
WYo. STAT. § 35-493 (Supp. 1967).
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and creates in its place such enormous confusion in all of our
towns and metropolitan cities in one fell swoop.""7
What the problems will be caused in the varied situations
of municipal health and housing codes is beyond the scope
of this treatise, but in the context of the enforcement of the
Wyoming Air Quality Act, it would seem that Justice Clark's
dissent position"8 would be somewhat alarmist. As a practical
matter, ambient air standards are measured from locations
outside of plant property, and apparently there would be
little problem in determining, in a relatively non-industrial
state like Wyoming, who is polluting the air, to what degree,
from where. 9
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

In the Wyoming Air Quality Act, it is declared "to be
the policy of the State of Wyoming to maintain a reasonable
degree of purity of the air resources of the state . . . and to
that end by rules, regulations, and standards based on scientific knowledge, require the use of available practical and
reasonable methods to prevent and control air pollution in
the State of Wyoming." 70 To facilitate this policy, an air
resources council is established7 1 which has the powers and
duties: "to develop and formulate a comprehensive program
for the prevention, control, and abatement of air pollution
,,'to devise,
in this state," . ''to manage its internal affairs,
formulate, adopt, amend, and repeal rules, regulations and
standards, but not to exceed federal standards," 7 4 to grant
variance,7 to hold hearings in connection with the promulgation of standards and granting of variances, and to compel
the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents
and other relevant matters. 6 Methods for enforcement of
these powers are also provided. 7
67. 387 U.s. 541, 547 (1967).
68. Id.
69. For a more complete treatment of enforcement problems created by the
Camara and the See decisions, refer to: Mulchay, Camara and See: A
Constitutional Problem with Effect on Air Pollution Control, 10 ARIz. L.
REV. 120-137 (1968). Also see, Morse & Juergensmeyer, Air Pollution Control in Indian In 1968, 2 VAL. L. REv. 312-314 (1968).
70. WYo. STAT. § 35-488 (Supp. 1967).
71. WYO. STAT. § 35-490 (Supp. 1967).
72. WYO. STAT. § 35-491(b) (Supp. 1967).
73. WYo. STAT. § 35-491(a) (Supp. 1967).
74. WYO. STAT. § 35-491(c) (Supp. 1967).
75. WYO. STAT. § 35-491(d) (Supp. 1967).
76. WYO. STAT. § 35-491(e) (Supp. 1967).
77. See discussion herein relating to 'taking', supra p.
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Froip this brief recitation of the policy to which the air
resources council is to address itself, and the powers with
which it is to carry out that policy, it is clear that we are
dealing with a delegation of authority from the Wyoming
Legislature to the council. In other words, the legislature has
established an administrative agency charged with effectuating a specific policy by creation of and enforcement of rules
and regulations.
Certainly such a delegation of authority is commonplace
as a legislative practice in Wyoming, and as in common across
the United States. Professor Harold S. Bloomenthal7 has
stated:
The importance of administrative agencies in
Wyoming is demonstrated by the fact that there are
more than fifty agencies that either have powers of
adjudication or rules making or both on the state
level alone."'
A relevant question in regard to such a delegation of
power to an administrative agency is whether adequate standards have been established by the legislature to guide the
agency in its exercise of its powers. In the Wyoming Air
Quality Act, two crucial areas in which the "delegation of
authority" issue could become important are the criteria
formulated in the act for the establishment of standards and
requirements, and the criteria for the granting of variances
from the general standards.
Section 35-4940 of the Act reauthorizes 8 the council to
establish "ambient air standards and/or emission requirements by rule or regulation, as in its judgment may be necessary to prevent, abate, or control air pollution." Criteria
established to guide the council's judgment are as follows:
the council must "consider all the facts and circumstances
bearing upon the reasonableness of the emissions involved,
including . . . character and degree of injury to the health
and physical property of the people and the flora and fauna
within the state, 2 the social and economic value of the source
78. Professor of Law, University of Wyoming Law School.
79. Bloomentha], Administrative Law in Wyoming-An Introduction and Preliminary Report, 16 Wyo. L.J. 191, 192 (1962).
80. WYO. STAT. (Supp. 1967).
81. See WYO. STAT. § 35-491(a) (Supp. 1967).
82. Wyo. STAT. § 35-494(i) (A) (Supp. 1967).
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of the air pollution, 3 the priority of location in the area involved, 4 and the technical practicability and economic reasonableness of reducing or eliminating the emissions resulting
from such source." 5 Finally, the council is authorized to
"grant such time as it shall find to be reasonable and necessary for owners and operators of air contaminant sources
to comply with such standards or requirements.""
The relatively detailed criteria laid down to guide the
council's decision as to the reasonableness of the emissions in
regard to the council's setting of general air pollution standards would appear to be about as detailed as the drafters
could possibly get without handicapping the effectiveness of
the council with an "overkill" of guidelines to consider in the
course of making a decision.
While the guidelines might be a target of attack upon
the constitutionality of the Act, they would be upheld as an
adequately detailed delegation of authority to an administrative agency. In an earlier article in the Wyoming Law
Journal on administrative rule making in Wyoming, it was
noted that:
A sampling of standards imposed on Wyoming
agencies that are similar to those which have been
held adequate on the Federal level of delegation
assert that the particular agency may promulgate
rules and regulations which are: "proper and necessary" [Board of Registration of Chiropody], "as
it may deem necessary" [Board of Cosmetology],
"reasonable rule" [Insurance Commission], and
others." '
Wyoming case law has supported broad delegations of
authority in the past.8 8
In Brinegar v. Clark," the court stated that a statute"0
which authorized the State Fire Marshall to "promulgate
necessary rules and regulations for the better protection of
the lives and property of the public" was a valid delegation
83. WYO. STAT. § 35-494(i) (B)
84. WYO. STAT. § 35-494(i) (C)
85.
86.
87.

88.

(Supp. 1967).
(Supp. 1967).

WYO. STAT. § 35-494(i) (D) (Supp. 1967).
WYO. STAT. § 35-491 (ii) (Supp. 1967).
Note, 16 Wyo. L.J. 257, 262 (1962).

For discussion of cases in addition to those referred
L.J. 257, 262-264 (1962).
89. 371 P.2d 62 (Wyo. 1962).
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of a legislative function even though the fire marshall, instead
of formulating his own standards, merely adopted his minimum standards from a National Board of Fire Underwriters'
pamphlet.
In Marion v. City of Lander"' the Court upheld a statute
delegating plenary power as to local improvement districts to
cities and towns. " In answer to counsel's argument that the
statute failed to fix proper standards as to the nature and
extent of the improvement to be made, the court stated:
Of course, the statutes furnish general standards,
but counsel's complaint is lack of detail. We [find]
no constitutional inhibitions against such a delegation of power. Concerning such grant we also said,
at 205 P. 1016, that determination "of the extent of
the improvement and what shall be included in it"
is the exercise of a legislative power and rests in the
legislative discretion of the city council. That being
true, it follows that no impropriety results in leaving
details to the city council and unless it exceeds
such power or exercises its discretion in a fraudulent,
arbitrary, or capricious manner .
the courts will
9
not interfere.
A fine statement as to what elements constitute a proper
delegation of legislative power was made in the neighboring
jurisdiction of Montana in the case of City of Missouli v.
Missoula County," in which the court stated:
[I]f an act but authorizes the administrative officer
or board to carry out the definitely expressed will of
the Legislature, although procedural directions and
the things to do are specified only in general terms,
it is not vulnerable to the criticism that it carries a
delegation of legislative power. "
It should further be noted that the Wyoming Air Quality
Act limits the power of the council to set standards by the
statement already noted" to the effect that Wyoming standards may not exceed Federal standards. This provides a
definite quantitative limitation on the powers of the council
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

WYo. STAT. § 35-421 (1957).
394 P.2d 910 (Wyo. 1964).
Wyo. STAT. §§ 15-444 to -512 (1957).
394 P.2d 910, 915-916 (Wyo. 1964).
362 P.2d 539 (Mont. 1961).
Id. at 541.
WYo. STAT. § 35-491(c) (Supp. 1967).
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and so in an important aspect limits the scope of the council's

judgment as to what the standards shall be.
Therefore, the Air Quality Act, with its four policy
guidelines,97 plus the quantitative Federal standard limitation would seem to have enumerated adequate legislative
guidelines for the establishment of air standards and
requirements.
The criteria for the granting of variances from the general ambient air standards, like the general standard criteria,
would also appear to be well within the safe zone of valid
legislative guidelines in regard to delegation of authority.
The council is authorized to grant variances if "the variances do not tend to endanger human health or safety, and
that compliance with the rules or regulations from which
variance is sought would produce serious hardships, without
equal or greater benefits to the public."99 Also, the variances
are subject to renewal, °0 and are further subject to the time
table limitation... for hardship cases and the "availability
of practical means of abatement" limitation.0 2
The variance section of the Air Quality Act would fit
into the same general category of legislative delegation of
powers as the previous section dealing with guidelines for
setting the general standards. Therefore, the Wyoming Court
would probably apply its philosophy of allowing relatively
broad administrative guidelines to a variance problem as
readily as to a general standards guideline question. However, because of the proliferation of local zoning ordinances
in recent years, many specific legislative variance guidelines
have been litigated as to their adequacy as constitutional delegations of authority. Therefore, some further elaboration is
in order.
The Wyoming Air Quality Act has three basic guidelines
for the council to consider in granting variances: public health
and safety, economic hardship, and finally, benefits to the
97. Public health; economic value of the source regulated; priority of location;
and, technical practicability of reducing air pollution. WYO. STAT. § 35494(i) (Supp. 1967).
98. Wyo. STAT. § 35-491(c) (Supp. 1967).
99. Wyo.STAT. § 35-497(a) (Supp. 1967).
100. Wyo. STAT. § 35-497(d) (Supp. 1967).
101. WYo. STAT. § 35-497(c) (i) (Supp. 1967).
102. WYo. STAT. § 35-497(c) (ii) (Supp. 1967).
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public as weighed against hardship created by the regulation.
Variance provisions with combinations of guidelines similar
to the Wyoming Act's have generally been held to be constitutional.' The logic of courts in holding such variance guidelines constitutional is well illustrated by a quote from Ward
v. Scott,' a New Jersey case which held a variance guideline section similar to Wyoming's constitutional.
The court stated:
Nor do we see any real dangers that unwarranted
or arbitrary action will successfully survive the
ample safeguards which are ever available. It is true
that in lieu of the general standards set forth the
Legislature might have sought to anticipate and
enumerate with fixed details all of the individual
special instances in which variance would be justified. However, experience has indicated the unwisdom of this course, and an acknowledged advantage
of the administrative process has been its flexibility
in enabling administrators to deal justly with unanticipated as well as anticipated situations in accordance with general legislative guides." 5
In the issue of delegation of authority is the inherent
conflict between the desire, on one band, to protect the public
from unwarranted or arbitrary action on the part of administrators who have been given a blank check as to their
authority, and on the other, the necessity of allowing administrators enough flexibility to be able to accomplish the purposes, beneficial to society as a whole, for which the agency
was created. The Air Quality Act's general standard and
variance provisions attempt to hit the elusive balance point
in this conflict.
The Wyoming court, which apparently has accepted the
philosophy of allowing relatively broad administrative guidelines to pass as constitutional, would probably give the Air
Quality Act's guidelines "the benefit of the doubt" on the
delegation of authority issue. By doing this, however, the
court would not necessarily be making any concession to creation of an "arbitrary or unwarranted" use of authority.
As has previously been stressed, Air Quality Act guidelines
103. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1083-1126. See also A.L.R.2d LATER CASE
104. 11 N.J. 117, 93 A.2d 385 (1952).
105. Id., 93 A.2d at 389.
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for both "general standard" and "variance" situations are
about as detailed as could be designed if the council is to be
left with some flexibility. Secondly, the Air Quality Act
procedures are all subject to the authority of the Wyoming
Administrative Procedure Act,'
which sets up standards
for notice, hearing procedures, rights of parties in contested
cases, judicial review, and many other provisions which are
designed to protect the rights of a person or business affected
by a decision of the council.'
IMPAR TIAL HEARINGS

Section 12 (a) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure
Act of 1966"os provides that [when] an officer of a hearing
board shall withdraw if he feels himself at any time to be
disqualified, and provides that the officer function in an
impartial manner.
Originally, the Act provides that the Board of Health
will appoint someone from the Department to represent the
Department of Public Health on the Clean Air Council.
Further, the Act provides that an administrative division of
the Department of Public Health shall enforce and administer this Act. 9 Had these provisions been left without consideration, any future decision of the Wyoming Clean Air
Council could have been exposed to an attack on the basis
that the representative of the Department of Public Health,
being the department charged with enforcement of the Act,
could not have maintained an impartial position in the
decision.
However, the problem has been foreseen, and the Council
has amended its rules of practice and procedure to provide
that the representative from the Department of Public Health
excuses himself from sitting with the Council in hearing a
complaint brought by his department before the Council."0
106. WYO. STAT. §§ 35-498, -491(e) and -497(e) (Supp. 1967).
107. WYO. STAT. §§ 9-276.19 to -276.33 (Supp. 1967).
108.

WYO. STAT. § 9-276.30(a)

(Supp. 1967).

109. WYO. STAT. § 35-492 (Supp. 1967).
110. In an interview with Assistant Attorney General Speight, assigned to advise
the Council pursuant to § 2 of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act
[Wyo. STAT. § 9-276.20(c) (Supp. 1967)], Mr. Speight indicated that the
decisions of the Council would be less vulnerable to litigation if and when
the change is embodied in an amendment to the Act, rather than reply on
the Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the Council itself to
change statutory law.
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EXCLUSION OF INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYEES

The novel question which perhaps may be of little concern to the implementation of the Act, is raised by Section
35-502 of the 1957 Wyoming Statutes. In this section, subsections (a) and (b) remove from the jurisdiction of the
council any pollution created by a person which pollution
remains on the premises of the polluter. Subsection (a)
would appear to be dead-letter law from the date of the
statute, as to pollution emitted into the atmosphere and falling on the pollutant's property. It is difficult to imagine,
in windy Wyoming, where air is most ambient, that pollution emitted into the open air would never journey beyond
the boundaries of the pollutant's property. But, the problem
that appears in these two subsections is that it does preclude
the Council from acting to reduce pollution inside the factory
or mine, etc. These provisions effectively exclude employees
from protection under the Act, specifically so by Subsection
(c). While the State has made some provision for the control
of air pollution within the plant, these provisions are generally"' very weak, except for those providing for sanitation
in coal mines." 2 Thus, exclusion of the industrial employee
from the provisions of the Act effectively deprive the employee of protection from the health hazards which is provided for every other class of citizen under the Act. These
subsections, then, may be open to a valid attack from the
employee as discriminatory in that he, a member of the
public, is excluded as a class, and is therefore being denied
equal protection under the law.
SEVERABILITY

It may be suggested, in taking an over-view of the complete Act, that one standard provision is lacking, that is, no
provision has been made for severability. Omission of such
a clause will, in all likelihood, be of little consequence, as no
court is likely to negate the whole act, should a single provision be found unconstitutional. If the provision is so substantial as to constitute the heart of the Act, little benefit
will be derived from the addition of a severability clause."'
WYO. STAT. § 30-75 [mines, generally] and §§ 35-80 to -82 [industrial]
(1957).
112. Coal mines, WYO. STAT. § 30-130 to -190 (1957).
113. See McFarland v. City of Cheyenne, 48 Wyo. 86, 42 P.2d 413, 416 (1935);
Stewart v. City of Cheyenne, 60 Wyo. 497, 154 P.2d 355, 370 (1944) ; Hanson
v. Town of Greybull, 63 Wyo. 467, 183 P.2d 393, 399 (1947).
111.
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CONCLUSION

As has been stressed so often, air pollution is one of the
major problems an industrialized America faces in today's
world. The passage of the Wyoming Air Quality Act by the
state legislature is recognition that this national problem can
extend even to the plains and mountains of Wyoming. Fortunately, the Wyoming Air Quality Act is more than a tacit
recognition of the problem, it is also, and most importantly,
a means to the end of solving the problem. Some states far
more industrialized than the State of Wyoming have passed
what appear to be far less effective legislation to deal with
the problem of air pollution."' Their type of minimal legislation, while recognizing the problem, does little in a practical
vein to provide the means to its solution. We would submit
that recognition alone, without effective methods of solution
would be disasterous to the success of air pollution control at
present, and that the effects of this disaster could be felt for
generations to come.
Since the article originated from the frontier State of
Wyoming, the following analogy, may not be inappropriate:
If effective measures are not soon taken, clean air will go
the way of the American Buffalo. In a ten year period, vast
herds of buffalo were annihilated from the western prairies
with no rhyme or reason to the slaughter, and creating, as a
result, the waste of what might have been a valuable natural
resource. Without effective control now, this analogy may
become all too pertinent to the quality of the air breathed in
the State of Wyoming. The phenomenal growth of American
industry will not allow piecemeal and token attempts to
regulate the types and amounts of emissions it sends into
our atmosphere.
The Wyoming Air Quality Act, subject as it might be to
some of the criticisms which have here been made of it, still
is a workable piece of legislative machinery, sound in the
important aspects of adequate legislative guidelines with
which to achieve the purpose of the act and enforcement
techniques with teeth in them; yet at the same time recognizing generally the rights of individuals or businesses affected by the Act, and providing for workable conciliation and
114. See Morse & Juergensmeyer, supra note 69, at 296-314.
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variance procedures which can, if used, effectively reduce
the onerous effect of the Act on certain types of businesses
to a minimum.
The Act is still in an embryonic stage, having only just
been passed in the 1967 Wyoming Legislature, and having
not yet been litigated. The matters so far to come before the
council have been resolved through the medium of conciliation
and conference between the council and the affected parties.
If the future use of the Act can continue in this spirit of
cooperation, working on a personalized level with present or
future contaminant sources to find a mutually acceptable way
to keep the pollutant level of the air under control, Wyoming
will benefit from a sensible and relatively painless method
of solving the serious problem of air pollution.
BRIAN T. MC CAULEY
DANIEL J.
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